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Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict
The ”Ethnicisation” of Public Space in Romania
DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN
Following decades of communist rule and social atomization, Romania faces today 
numerous challenges in the process of rebirth of the public space. Whereas public space 
is defined as an autonomous space of dialogue, free of all kinds of constraints, a space 
of equality and commitment1, we try to assess the importance of an essential factor 
that burdens the process of democratization in the region, namely ethnic nationalism. 
We are interested here in a special component of nationalism that is ethnic symbolism. 
The use of ethnic symbols by the two largest ethnic segments in the multiethnic 
province of Transylvania, ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians, ranges from 
the public use of Hungarian to the requirements for the Romanian citizenship and 
the special ties between the Hungarian diaspora and the kin state. The most striking 
symbolic crises that influence on ethnic relations in Transylvania are related to the 
naming of localities and the use of Hungarian in public local administration, to the 
education in Hungarian language, to the management of a multilingual university 
and even the creation of a separate Hungarian language university in Transylvania. 
But the struggle to symbolically dominate the public space is also visible in mixed 
urban areas. Street names and statues in Transylvanian cities stand as ethnic markers 
in ethnically divided areas.
As we will underline below, although essential for the democratization process 
in Eastern Europe, ethnic conflict has been initially neglected by the early transition 
literature. By comparing Eastern Europe to Southern Europe and Latin America, it 
soon become obvious that stateness and nationhood issues are to be added to the more 
classical earlier transitions that encompassed democratization and marketization2. 
Those factors could, in fact, more appropriately explain the slower democratization 
progress made by different societies in the region, especially emphasizing on the 
inchoate public space. In this respect, ethnic symbolism is a major obstacle in generating 
a neutral public space. Whereas recurrent crises between ethnic Romanians and 
ethnic Hungarians stand upon a widespread use of ethnic symbols, the subsequent 
”ethnicisation” of the public space undermines the efforts made in setting up limited 
power-sharing agreements and, as some optimist scholars expect, in fostering a trans-
ethnical identity that enables a future peaceful cohabitation of ethnic Romanians and 
ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania.
1 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1989.
2 Taras KUZIO, ”Transition in Post-communist States: Triple or Quadruple”, Politics, 
vol. 21, no. 3, 2001, pp. 168-177.
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ETHNIC CONFLICT, SYMBOLIC POWER AND THE PUBLIC SPACE
Despite their own definition of ethnicity, many researchers consider ethnic 
segments to be constantly in competition1. Though some early scholars of nationalism 
believe that ethnicity is a natural, organic, perennial, unitarian and culturally defined 
category2, many other scholars contested this view and developed a ”constructivist” 
conception of the nation as it is the outcome of the modernization, and therefore 
should be defined as a modern, mechanical, divided, crafted by cultural elites, 
mainly through mass communication mechanisms3. However nations are defined4, 
they are competing entities. This is especially obvious in urban contexts5. As 
Bollens emphasizes, although we recently experienced an unprecedented economic 
integration with globalization and ”mega-narratives” of modernization (high 
technology and education), we also bear witness to subversive ”micro-narratives” 
that fuel oppositional movements6. It seems that social fragmentation has been a 
common companion alongside the economic integration, which is most visible in the 
inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist urban fractures. 
In disputed cities ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for 
group rights. Sharing the same urban space generally forces the ethnic segments to 
adopt different strategies of coexistence: to try to dominate the public space when 
they consider powerful enough or to negotiate the division of the public space and 
the preservation of their community autonomy when they feel threatened by other 
ethnic groups. Though ethnic conflict and the effort to dominate the public space are 
not confined to urban areas, we will mainly focus on urban settings because cities 
are focal points of urban and regional economies dependent of multi-ethnic contacts, 
social and cultural centers and platforms for political expression, and potential centers 
of grievance and mobilization7.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, David LAITIN, ”Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Annual Review 
of Sociology, vol. 24, 1998, pp. 423-452; M. BANTON, Racial and Ethnic Competition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983; Ernest GELLNER, Culture, Identity and Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987; David HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1985.
2 Hans KOHN, The Idea of Nationalism, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967; L. SNYDER, 
The Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954.
3 Elie KEDOURIE, Nationalism, Hutchinson, London, 1960; Ernest GELLNER, Thought 
and Change, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964; Reinhard BENDIX, Nation-Building and 
Citizenship, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1964; Gabriel ALMOND, Lucian PYE 
(eds.), Comparative Political Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965; Karl DEUTSCH, 
Nationalism and Social Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1953; Karl DEUTSCH, Willam 
FOLZ (eds.), Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1963.
4 Anthony D. SMITH, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of 
Nations and Nationalism, Routledge, New York, 1998.
5 S.A. BOLLENS, Urban Peace-Building in Divided Societies: Belfast and Johannesburg, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1999; IDEM, ”City and Soul: Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, 
Nicosia”, CITY: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, vol. 6, no. 1, 2001, 
pp. 169-178; IDEM, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, in R. HAMBLETON, H.V. SAVITCH, 
M. STEWART (eds.), Globalism and Local Democracy: Challenge and Change in Europe and North 
America, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002; IDEM, ”Urban Governance at the Nationalist 
Divide: Coping with Group-based Claims”, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 2007, 
pp. 229-253.
6 S.A. BOLLENS, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, cit., p. 109.
7 Ibidem, p. 109.
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The symbolic domination of the public space relates, as we conceive it, to 
mechanisms of differentiation and power1, as well as to banal nationalism2. In fact, 
those efforts of domination are banal nationalism, in the way it differs from hot, hard 
nationalism, based on violent and bloody conflicts3. In the same time, they are not 
material, but symbolic conflicts, as they tend to spatially mark the dominance of 
ethnic groups and by that to strengthen their very identity in a perpetual manner4. 
Our approach tends to combine these two perspectives as it takes into account the 
mechanisms of differentiation and power, largely invested by ethnic groups’ elites, and 
soft, everyday nationalism, backed up by banal items as road signs and street names. 
The domination of the public space could therefore range from street names and road 
signs to flags and more specific buildings, such as churches, museums or foreign 
embassies5. In this respect, we are close to Brubakers’ definition of ethnic groups as 
practical categories, classificatory schemes and cognitive frames and would like to 
unravel the ”work” done by nations as competing actors in urban settings6. Therefore, 
the aim of our paper is twofold. First, we intend here to unravel the symbolic, non-
material and power-marking elements of more broader conflicts in Transylvania, i.e. 
those over territorial design, linguistic rights and education, and not only to focus on 
more classical symbolic issues as buildings and statues. In fact, all of these symbols 
are parts of the effort made by national elites to consolidate national identity and to 
claim national hegemony in disputed territories7 and to generally ”invent a tradition” 
and elaborate a language of symbolic practice and communication8.
Second, we intend to broaden the framework of the symbolic conflict and to 
stress on a new approach, which is the consequence of ethno-symbolism, namely 
the ”ethnicisation” of public space. According to Habermas9, the public sphere, or 
1 Pierre BOURDIEU, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Routledge, 
London, 1984; IDEM, The Field of Cultural Production, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.
2 M. BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, Sage, London, 1995.
3 M. IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Verso, London, 
1994.
4 Anthony GIDDENS, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction. 
Macmillan, London, 1979.
5 J. BORNEMANN, Belonging to Two Berlins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992; M. AZARYAHU, ”The Power of Commemorative Street Names”, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 14, no. 3, 1996, pp. 311-330; B.S.A. YEOH, ”Street-naming and 
Nation-building: Toponymic Inscriptions and Nationhood in Singapore”, Area, vol. 28, no. 3, 
1996, pp. 298-307; M. AZARYAHU, ”German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names: 
The Case of East Berlin”, Political Geography, vol. 16, no. 6, 1997, pp. 479-493; Duncan LIGHT, 
”Political Change and Official Public Landscapes: Renaming Streets in Bucharest after 1989”, 
Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, pp. 106-131; R. JONES, P. MERRIMAN, 
”Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism: Bilingual Road Signs in Wales”, Political Geography, 
vol. 28, no. 3, 2009, pp. 164-173.
6 Rogers BRUBAKER, ”Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as an Institutionalized Form, 
Practical Category, Contingent Event”, Contention, vol. 4, no. 1, 1994, pp. 3-14.
7 B. GRAHAM, C. NASH, ”A Shared Future: Territoriality, Pluralism and Public Policy in 
Northern Ireland”, Political Geography, vol. 25, no. 3, 2006, pp. 253-278; J. NAGLE, ”The Right 
to Belfast City Centre: From Ethnocracy to Liberal Multiculturalism?”, Political Geography, 
vol. 28, no. 2, 2009, pp. 132-141.
8 Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1870, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990.
9 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere…cit.
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the public space, is the environment accepting the public political reasoning, an 
environment in which the individual can speak freely and where the arguments are 
not influenced by any political or social power. It makes possible for everyone to 
express itself regardless of any constraints on time, resources, participation or themes. 
It is the space created by the discursive interactions between private people willing to 
let arguments, not status or authority of tradition, to be decisive1. Thus, public sphere 
is a medium for political justification, for putting the decision-makers to account, as 
well as for political initiative, the mobilizing of political support. The public sphere 
not only enables autonomous opinion formation, but also empowers the citizens 
to influence the decision-makers2. Although public sphere is an essential feature of 
democratization, one of the main challenges is the definition of the community and of 
the public space itself. Deeply divided societies have, in this respect, greater difficulties 
in assessing the common grounds for political institutions and practices that rule 
society. Even democracy, as one might define it as majority rule, is questionable in 
these settings3.
Finally, our approach intends to integrate a spatial perspective into the analysis of 
the public sphere and to unify the range of ethnic symbolic domination mechanisms 
in Transylvania. The ”ethnicisation” of the public space that we unravel here is made 
by mechanisms of spatial domination that encompasses the use of spatial symbolic 
markers, but also by more subtle elements as citizenship and language. From a broader 
perspective, the way citizenship is conceived or minority linguistic rights accepted also 
defines the public sphere. In fact, nation can be broadly viewed as primarily defined 
by culture or by territory. The cultural or ethnic nation has ethnicity as the basis of 
membership and emphasizes on culture as its cohesive component. By contrast, the 
civic nation has territory as the basis of membership, while citizenship is the cohesive 
component. The civic nation is therefore a community relating to a given territory, 
the universal law and the broad political participation turning the community into 
a nation. In this respect, many new democracies have greater difficulties in both 
promoting equal rights and liberties and strengthening the ethnic cohesion of the 
dominant group4. These regimes are only selectively open regimes: they possess a 
range of partial democratic features that are political competition, free media and 
significant civil rights, although they fail to be universal or comprehensive in that the 
political regime refrains from interfering with the ongoing ethnicisation project of the 
ethnic dominant group. Defining nation and the use of ethnic symbolism in Romania 
largely impact on the construction of the public space, on what we have called the 
growing ”ethnicisation” of the public sphere.
1 P. JOHNSON, ”Habermas’s Search for the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Social 
Theory, vol. 4, no. 2, 2001, pp. 215-236.
2 E.O. ERIKSEN, ”An Emerging European Public Sphere”, European Journal of Social Theory, 
vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, pp. 341-363.
3 Arend LIJPHART, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the 
Netherlands, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968; IDEM, ”Consociational Democracy”, 
World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969, pp. 207-225; IDEM, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative 
Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977.
4 Sammy SMOOHA, ”The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic 
State”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 475-503.
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SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND THE ”ETHNICISATION” 
OF THE PUBLIC SPACE IN TRANSYLVANIA
Before focusing on symbolic conflict, let us briefly present the ethnic context 
in Transylvania. Although it is a Romanian province today, Transylvania broke up 
from the Habsburg Empire in 1918. Even when it was a former Habsburg province, 
Transylvania was numerically dominated by ethnic Romanians, their ethnic group 
representing in the 19th century more than half of the province’s population. At the 
age of the European nationalism, Romanian elites formed a strong political movement 
claiming cultural and political rights for the Romanian community1. The one hundred 
years struggle ended in Transylvania’s secession in 1918 and the subsequent union 
with the Romanian national state. On the other hand, Romania proclaimed earlier 
its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 and obtained the recognition of 
its independence and full sovereignty the following year, during the Peace Congress 
held in Berlin2. Excepting the Jewish and Gipsy communities, Romania was at that 
time almost ethnically homogeneous. The integration of Transylvania would reveal 
much more difficult, because it brought in large ethnic and religious minorities, with 
their own active and well-organized elites3. This time the struggle for nation-building 
was between Romanian rural background and Western urban modernity, since the 
province’s cities were largely dominated by ethnic Hungarians and Germans.
As Bollens emphasizes, cities are suppliers of important religious and cultural 
symbols, zones of intergroup proximity and intimacy, and arenas where the size and 
concentration of a subordinate population can present the most direct threat to the 
state4. This is exactly the case of urban communities in Transylvania, after its union 
with Romania in 1918. These cities become the arena of harsh conflicts between local 
German and Hungarian elites and Romanian elites, strongly backed by Romanian 
central state authorities. Whereas the latter tried to bring under control and culturally 
homogenize the urban areas, the former made huge efforts to preserve their cultural 
institutions and identity5. This contradiction is to be found during the entire 20th 
century, regardless of the political system that ruled Romania. During the 1930’s, 
the struggle between Romanian rural background and the Western-style urban 
modernity shaped the political activity and lead to the rise to power of the Romanian 
extreme-right6. Although the first decade of communist rule proclaimed itself as 
internationalist, the last two decades of Romanian communism turned into a fierce 
nationalist regime, which resembled more to inter-war public discourse and political 
1 Keith HITCHINS, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1969; IDEM, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement 
in Transylvania, 1860-1914, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1999. 
2 IDEM, Romania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
3 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and 
Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995.
4 S.A. BOLLENS, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, cit, p. 112.
5 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit.
6 Francisco VEIGA, La Mistica del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierro, 
Rumania, 1919-1941, Publicacions de la Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 1989; 
Leon VOLOVICI, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 
1930s, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991.
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activity that to internationalist communism1. Yet nationalism was a suitable political 
vehicle even after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, as it was used by its 
successors in order to consolidate on power2. The claimed threat to state unity and 
sovereignty then was the ethnic conflict in Târgu-Mureş, where ethnic clashes could 
have triggered an ethnic disaster, more or less similar to those who have ravaged the 
former Yugoslavia. Since these events, ethnic politics strongly marked the political 
dynamics of Romania3. Although Romania followed a different path of exit from 
communism than Yugoslavia, post-communist transition did not exclude the use of 
ethnic tensions and of subsequent mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic segments 
in most of its heterogeneous urban contexts, like Cluj, for example. The economic 
and cultural capital of the Hungarians in Transylvania during the 19th century, Cluj 
was among the largest and most important cities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
After the First World War and the union of Transylvania with the kingdom of Romania 
in 1918, Hungarians remained the majority of the city until the 1960’s, when ethnic 
Romanians began to outnumber ethnic Hungarians. This was mainly due to the 
forced industrial and demographic policies of the communist regime that favored 
Romanian population influx into the city. After 1989, the city was ruled for 12 years 
by a Romanian nationalist mayor that raised the tensions between ethnic Hungarians 
and ethnic Romanians by numerous acts of ethnic provocation4. But all major cities 
in the region, like Târgu-Mureş, Oradea, Timişoara, Arad or Braşov turned into 
ethnically Romanian cities during communism and minorities’ demographic share 
is still dropping5.
Street Names and Statues in Ethnically Polarized Towns
The domination of public space is mainly related to symbolic items as street names 
and statues, but also to symbolic issues that can be analyzed from other perspectives, as 
linguistic issues by linguistic nationalism. Items as street names and statues generally 
stand for identity markers and express the willingness of ethnic groups to appropriate 
urban space6. Additionally, street names evoke specific historical eras by expressing 
1 Elemér ILLYÉS, National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania, East European 
Monographs, Boulder, 1982; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity 
and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995; Juan 
J. LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.
2 Tom GALLAGHER, ”Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s”, in Duncan 
LIGHT, David PHINNEMORE (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001.
3 M.E. MCINTOSH, M. ABELE MAC IVER, D.G. ABELE, D.B. NOLLE, ”Minority Rights 
and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria”, Social Forces, vol. 73, no. 3, 1995, 
pp. 939-967.
4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist 
Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2006.
5 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Schimbări în harta etnică a României, Ethnocultural Diversity 
Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.
6 B.S.A. YEOH, ”Street-naming and Nation-building…cit.”.
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the ideological dominance of political rulership1. Moreover, street names and statues 
commemorate past events and heroes, and therefore strengthen collective identity by 
constructing and reconstructing history and tradition2. In particular settings, they help 
strengthen the feeling of belonging to the urban space, thus they are a key element 
for identity politics. As Transylvania moved from a given sovereignty to another and 
often switched the main ideology, few streets kept their names during the 20th century. 
As soon as the regime has changed in 1989, Hungarian community expressed his 
willingness to restore lost symbols, including street names, in a period marked by 
a general process of renaming streets in Romania. Changing street names was not a 
general purpose of the Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (DAHR), participation in central government between 1996 and 2000, yet 
achieving this goal in various local settings had to follow a complicated negotiation 
mechanism between Hungarian and Romanian parties. In the case of Târgu-Mureş, an 
ethnically mixed town in Transylvania, although DAHR councilors dominated local 
council, renaming streets and putting in place statues evoking Hungarian cultural 
heritage was subject to negotiation and approval of Romanian political parties in the 
city. On the other hand, putting in place the statue of the Romanian prince Michael 
the Brave, who conquered Transylvania for a short period of time at the end of 16th 
century3, was conditioned by putting in place the statue of the Hungarian prince 
Francis II Rákóczi, crowned in 1704 in the city as prince of Transylvania4.
The same symbolic conflict is to be noticed, on a larger scale, in Arad, another 
ethnically mixed town. The willingness of the Hungarian community to restore 
an ancient statue in town triggered one of the most vehement disputes during the 
governmental cooperation between DAHR and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). 
The dispute concerned the renovation and public exhibition of the statuary raised by 
the Hungarians in 1880 in order to commemorate the 1948-1849 Hungarian uprising 
against the Habsburgs5. The monumental statuary, also known as the ”Liberty 
Statue”, represents the 13 Hungarian revolutionary generals executed for mutiny 
by the Austrian imperial army. Dismantled in 1924 by the Romanian authorities, it 
was deposited for decades inside the local city fortress. The restoration of the statue 
was paid by the Hungarian local community, yet the replacement was contested 
by the Romanian community, because during the 1848-1849 civil war there were 
numerous clashes between Hungarian and Romanian nationalists in Transylvania, 
who generally remained faithful to the Austrian emperor. Although the Hungarian 
community demanded that the statuary be replaced in a city square, the Romanian 
authorities refused as long as Romanian national symbols would not accompany 
1 Duncan LIGHT, ”Political Change and Official Public Landscapes…cit”; M. AZARYAHU, 
”German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names…cit”; IDEM, “The Power of 
Commemorative Street Names”, cit.
2 E. HOBSBAWM, T. RANGER (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1983; J.R. GILLIS (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.
3 P.F. SUGAR, P. HANÁK, T. FRANK, A History of Hungary, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1994.
4 Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2004.
5 I. DEÁK, The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1979.
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the restored Hungarian statuary. Following years of political negotiations between 
DAHR and SDP local branches and the intervention of central government run by 
SDP, the common solution was to place those ethnic symbols into a ”Romanian-
Hungarian Reconciliation Park” in the city, which was finally inaugurated in August 
2005. An arch of triumph now stands alongside generals’ statuary and symbolizes 
the Romanian revolutionaries in Transylvania. Moreover, some of the Romanian local 
parties in Arad would love to expand and to turn the park into a ”Park of Ethnicities”, 
diluting further more Hungarian symbolism.
Ethnic Commemorations in Transylvania
One of the most striking symbolic issues in Transylvania are ethnic commemorations. 
Every March the 15th, the commemoration of the 1848 Hungarian revolutionaries 
in Transylvania reminds ethnic Hungarians of their natural ties with the whole 
Hungarian community in the Carpathians Basin and the Hungarian state. Though 
commemorations are a special ingredient in recent Hungarian tradition and politics1, 
Hungarian commemorations in Transylvania are a very sensitive issue for ethnic 
Romanians, as they raise not only Hungarian flags, but symbolic questions of 
belonging, allegiance, solidarity and national unity, because commemorations are 
rituals that remember fundamental myths and symbols to a given community. In 
return, Romanian parliament decided in 1990 to celebrate Romania’s national day 
every December the 1st, in symbolical remembrance of the secession of Transylvania 
from Austria-Hungary at the end of the First World War and its subsequent integration 
into the Kingdom of Romania.
As emphasized by Schöpflin, the myth is one of the ways in which collectivities 
(e.g. nations) establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own 
system of values, as it is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by a 
community about itself2. Myth provides the means for the members of a community 
to recognize that, broadly, they share a mindset. Through myth, boundaries are 
established within the community and also with respect to other communities, 
in a constant effort of ‘imagining’ the community3. The myth acts as means of 
standardization and of storage of information4 and, therefore, it is one of a number of 
crucial instruments in cultural reproduction5.
The endless question of nationhood, combined with daily nationalism and 
symbolic struggle in urban areas, might affect the rebirth of the public space in terms 
of neutral political institutions and practices that rule society. In fact, in socially 
1 B. FOWLER, ”Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics: 
the Case of the Millennial Commemorations”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2004, 
pp. 57-83.
2 G. SCHÖPFLIN, ”The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths”, in G. HOSKING, 
G. SCHÖPFLIN (eds.), Myths and Nationhood, Routledge, New York,1997, p. 19.
3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983.
4 Norbert ELIAS, The Symbol Theory, Sage, London, 1991.
5 Pierre BOURDIEU, ”Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power”, 
in N. DIRKS, G. ELEY, S.B. ORTNER (eds.), A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1994.
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and particularly in ethnically divided societies, the use of myths almost invariably 
enhances the division, unless there are myths that unite the groups across the divide. 
It is possible to conceptualize myths of citizenship that transcend ethnicity, underlines 
Schöpflin1, but these are rare (e.g. the Swiss case). Generally the myths of collective 
existence within the ethnic group are emphasized and a harder boundary is drawn 
against outsiders. This process is dynamic, imitative, and hard to break. If one group 
feels that it has to rely more and more heavily on myths of collective existence, the 
other will generally do the same. And on both sides symbolic politics fuel political 
discourse. The opposition between those two types of myths is best exemplified by 
the debate over the Romanian territorial design.
Ethnic Identities and Regional Design in Transylvania
The current debate on regional design opposes two main arguments: a trans-
ethnical regional identity and a clear-cut ethnic regional divide. The first argument 
is strongly emphasized by the Romanian proponents of regionalization, a handful of 
Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania who, back in 2000, triggered 
the debate on a new territorial design and new political relationship between centre 
and periphery. Their prior arguments are not economic, but political and cultural. 
According to them, the existing local political organization and centralization in 
Romania come from an ethnic Romanian definition of the state, which is strengthened 
day-to-day by the Romanian-Hungarian conflict in Transylvania. Fearing the 
Hungarian threat to Romanian statehood, Romanian nationalists and centralists, 
those who support the second argument, always invoke the conflict as the perfect 
argument for hard centralization. Therefore, the key for building up a peaceful and 
prosperous region of Transylvania would be a trans-ethnic party, composed by the 
political elites of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups and motivated by a kind of 
”civic regionalism”2. Romanian regionalists strongly believe that assuming regional 
identities on a civic basis contributes, in a multi-ethnic region like Transylvania, to 
the development of a trans-ethnical identity, through which it is possible to transcend 
extremist-nationalist nostalgia, fears or escalation, as well as the veiled nationalisms 
that often make use of a civic and democratic phraseology3.
Regional design was, in fact, a key issue in ethnic relations between ethnic 
Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania during the past century. The integration 
of new provinces in Greater Romania following the First World War brought in large 
ethnic and religious minorities. Thus organizing political space was a serious matter 
for Romanian elites who aimed to consolidate the new national state and unify the 
national culture4. The territory was then divided in 71 one counties that lasted until 
1948. During the Second World War, parts of Transylvania were attached back to the 
Hungarian state, only to be recovered by Romania at the end of the war. In 1948, 
Romanian communists reformatted for the first time the territorial administration in 
districts and oblasts, having in mind the soviet-type of organization. By this type of 
1 G. SCHÖPFLIN, “The Functions of Myth…cit.”, p. 24.
2 Gusztáv MOLNÁR, ”Regionalism civic”, Provincia, vol. I, no. 2, p. 7.
3 Tom GALLAGHER, ”Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s”, cit.
4 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit.
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administrative organization, Hungarian minority in Transylvania enjoyed a certain 
degree of autonomy in the general framework of an autonomous region. The 1968 
reform of Romanian administration, that still works today, eliminated such autonomy 
and tried to homogenize again the territory according to nationalistic purposes1.
The current regional design is today challenged by Hungarian nationalists in 
Transylvania. They oppose the Romanian unitary and centralized state by claiming the 
rights to self-govern in the framework of an autonomous region called ”Szeklerland”. 
The Civic Hungarian Party (CHP), a political organization of ethnic Hungarians in 
Transylvania which opposes to the moderate DAHR that successfully represented the 
ethnic community during the last two decades, settled a Szekler National Council as 
a representative body of Szeklers in Transylvania. Its goal is to define the autonomy of 
the Szeklerland, including the use of ethnic symbols like the anthem, the flag and the 
arms of the county. Szekler National Council also intends to propose a law regarding 
the autonomous region of Szeklerland. Moreover, the Council already proclaimed a 
declaration on the regional design, stating that Szeklerland is a distinct and indivisible 
territorial unit that can not be merged into another territorial unit. Therefore, state 
authorities should take care when it comes to reshape territorial design in Romania 
and fulfill the distinct Szeklerland with greater autonomy. The reaction of Romanian 
nationalists was instant. Romanian hard-line nationalists demanded a national 
referendum with compulsory voting, which clearly shows the dominance and the 
willingness of ethnic Romanians.
The opposition of those two political projects, the regionalist and the ethnic 
nationalist ones, clearly demonstrates the importance of ethnic symbolism. The 
regionalists seem to conceive ethnic groups as largely constructed, while Romanian and 
Hungarian nationalists take them as natural entities in conflict. We think regionalists’ 
project rely more on idealistic political models, like the working consociational 
democracies in place in Belgium or Switzerland, than on ground realities. The growing 
ethnic symbolism in Romanian turned into a large ”ethnicisation” of the public space, 
since ethnic segments constantly struggle to dominate each other. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely for Transylvania to build up a trans-national regional identity, since more 
modest power-sharing arrangements are missing. In fact, there is no general legislative 
framework for the status of ethnic minorities in Romania, and therefore ethnic 
segments are forced to defend their interests in every separate area, ranging from 
education to public administration. Moreover, extended rights and liberties largely 
depend on political coalitions in Romanian parliament and government, forcing 
DAHR to strengthen its ethnic profile when it comes to negotiate with Romanian 
parties. Yet painful negotiations tend to maximize ethnic opposition between groups 
and to extend the ethnicisation of the public space on an unprecedented scale.
For a cross-national identity to arise on the basis of a civic regionalism, as 
Transylvanian regionalists dream to, it is first necessary for ethnic groups’ elites to 
settle a pact on minorities’ rights and to refrain from the use of symbolic power. 
Otherwise, public space, especially in ethnically divided cities, will finally completely 
turn into a battle ground marked by the imposing symbols of ethnic groups, like 
the city of Cluj in the 1990s. The elected Romanian mayor, an outspoken nationalist, 
1 C. CHEN, ”The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis of the Leninist Legacy”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 166-
201; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism…cit.
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made then everything possible to assert the Romanian character of the city-center 
and to neutralize the Hungarian and Habsburg past1. He has threatened to move the 
historical equestrian statue of a Renaissance-era king of Hungary that dominates the 
central square, sponsored archaeological excavations in the square, designed to assert 
Romanian priority in Cluj, and erected towering flagpoles and flying Romanian flags 
on either side of the equestrian statue. Later he would replace white benches in the 
square with new ones painted in the Romanian national colors, in an endless effort 
to symbolically dominate Cluj city-center. Multiplying such symbolic battle ground 
at a larger scale in Transylvania could be a threat not only to a still idealistic civic 
regionalism that encompasses and levels ethnic identities, but it could be a direct 
threat to the previous efforts made for the minimum trust and cooperation between 
ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in the region.
ETHNIC STRUGGLE AND THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE
The issue of language is a key issue of a special kind of nationalism that is 
linguistic nationalism. This doctrine that originates in the late 18th century, states that 
the promotion, development, enrichment and standardization of national language is 
an essential political concern2. In the same time, language is a very sensitive symbolic 
issue. As national identity is an imagination of belonging to a larger community, 
as emphasized by Anderson3, the formation of language identity largely helps to 
strengthen the sense of national identity in many parts of the world4. As we are 
interested here in focusing on symbolic dimension of nationalism, we will not stress 
on other features of linguistic nationalism. Because issues of language cannot be 
easily accommodated within the standard framework adopted by western liberals 
in dealing with diversity, there is not a proven solution for the question of language, 
emphasize Kymlicka and Grin5. Whether western liberals solved the religious conflict 
by separating state and church and by ”privatizing” religion, they have hoped to apply 
the same model to other areas of diversity, in particular to ethno-cultural diversity. 
There should be no official or established culture, no public support for the culture, 
practices or identity of any particular group; this is the liberal project of coping with 
ethno-cultural diversity. While this is an attractive model in theory, it cannot work in 
practice. There is no possibility of ”privatizing” language issues. Therefore the state 
will always decide which will be the official language, which language will get the 
primacy and which one will be relegated to private life, and this fact is obviously in 
conflict with the liberal conception of freedom and equality6.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist 
Politics and Everyday Ethnicity…cit., p. 3.
2 A. PATTEN, ”The Humanist Roots of Linguistic Nationalism”, paper delivered at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004.
3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities…cit.
4 C. HARVIE, Scotland and Nationalism: 1707 to the Present, Routledge, London, 1994; 
R. JONES, L. DESFORGES, ”Localities and the Reproduction of Welsh Nationalism”, Political 
Geography, vol. 22, no. 3, 2003, pp. 271-292.
5 Will KYMLICKA, François GRIN, ”Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition 
Countries”, in Farimah DAFTARY, François GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politics in 
Transition Countries, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, pp. 1-28.
6 IDEM, ”Assessing the Politics of Diversity…cit.”, p. 9.
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The use of native language in Transylvania relates to public and road inscriptions, 
to teaching, as well as to the language to use when dealing to local administration. The 
use of native language is part of minorities’ cultural rights, yet the implementation 
of these rights unravels subsequent ethnic tensions. According to surveys on ethnic 
issues conducted in Transylvania and the whole Romania1, many ethnic Romanians 
disagree with the public use of Hungarian language. Though many of them consider 
that those of their friends who decided to learn Hungarian in order to keep in touch 
with ethnic Hungarian acquaintances are not to blame, they declare themselves 
offended by the public use of Hungarian and still believe that ethnic Hungarians 
willfully refuse to speak Romanian, despite the fact that, as Romanians think, they 
are fully capable to do so.
In early ’90s, the new Romanian constitution, the Local Administration Act and 
the Act on Education clearly reaffirmed the official unilinguism in a period marked by 
ethnic tensions2. The debate then concerned teaching in Hungarian and the restoration 
of educational establishments to the Hungarian minority, involving removing 
Romanian pupils from ethnically mixed schools. In fact, it was the reluctance of the 
Romanian government to negotiate a compromise with the Hungarian minority over 
education that contributed to a sharp polarization of both ethnic groups and the 
outbreak of street violence in Târgu-Mureş on 18-19 March 19903. Despite high ethnic 
tensions, concessions have been made only following 1996, when DAHR was part of 
the Romanian governing coalition. The linguistic policies then shifted from linguistic 
hegemony to an accommodation model, allowing the expansion of minorities’ 
language use, but keeping intact the primacy of the official language and stating 
the use of minorities’ languages as acceptable exceptions4. Romania now allows full 
education in minority languages, but also provides a minimum education in Romanian. 
Despite official unilinguism, the use of minority languages is allowed in local public 
institutions where the concerned linguistic minorities surpass a 20% threshold and 
encompasses official communication in Hungarian between local institutions and 
citizens and between elected officials themselves during local meetings, although 
official acts of those authorities continue to be issued in Romanian.
Language and Citizenship
Language is also related to citizenship, and citizenship shapes the way people 
conceive community, liberties and equality5. In a way, community is the object of 
1 Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul relaţiilor etnice 
1994-2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România, Ethnocultural Diversity 
Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.
2 Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania: the 
Hungarian Minority in Context”, in Farimah DAFTARY, François GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity and 
Language Politics…cit., pp. 243-266.
3 Ibidem, p. 251.
4 István HORVÁTH, ”Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din România”, in Levente SALAT 
(ed.), Politici de integrare a minorităţilor naţionale din România. Aspecte legale şi instituţionale într-o 
perspectivă comparată, Ethnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2008.
5 Charles TAYLOR, ”The Politics of Recognition”, in A. GUTMANN (ed.), Multiculturalism 
and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; B. BARRY, Culture 
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struggle in which different moral geographies are imagined, since community is 
negotiated as particular constructions of citizenship are put forward1. In this respect, 
the Romanian Constitution reflects the ethnic tensions from the first years of post-
communism by the willingness of the dominant group to express the dominant 
position of the Romanian demographic majority and language. Kettley stresses that 
some disputed points in the text of the Constitution, namely the proclamation of 
Romania as a national state, the subsequent sovereignty based on the unity of the 
Romanian people (as an ethnic definition of the community) and the mono-linguism, 
generated the protests of the Hungarian political elites2. In fact, the use of Romanian 
language proves to be an essential requirement for citizenship in Romania. When 
compared to other requirements for citizenship in Europe, the Romanian peculiarity 
lies in the lack of distinctiveness between the origin, the ethnic aspect and the 
civic aspect of citizenship and also in the emphasis on the language requirements3. 
Therefore, the claim of the Hungarian ethnic community to openly use Hungarian 
language in state administration and education is one of the most sensitive issues for 
Romanian ethnic majority.
Hungarian-Romanian political and ethnic relations have been seriously challenged 
in 2001 by an incident that unraveled the symbolic stake of ethnic nationalism in 
Transylvania. That was the Hungarian law designed to give a series of rights (seasonal 
working permits, social security provisions, travel, education and health benefits) in 
the kin country to Hungarian minority abroad4. The Hungarian law was received 
with fierce nationalist criticism by Hungary’s neighbors5. Although the law explicitly 
stated practical issues, it was considered by Hungary’s neighboring states rather a 
symbolic issue, an attempt to symbolically expand the boundaries of the Hungarian 
nation6. The political motivations of the Hungarian law are questionable. On the 
one hand, political parties in Hungary exacerbated the references to the past in their 
political rhetoric, the emotional appeals and the use of political identity campaigns 
and therefore encouraged symbolic populism in government7. Using Rajacic’s 
and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 
2001; Will KYMLICKA, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; G. VALENTINE, T. SKELTON, ”The Right to Be Heard: 
Citizenship and Language”, Political Geography, vol. 26, no. 2, 2007, pp. 121-140.
1 L.A. STAEHELI, ”Citizenship and the Problem of Community”, Political Geography, 
vol. 27, no. 1, 2008, pp. 5-21.
2 Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania…cit.”.
3 Dragoş DRAGOMAN, ”National Identity and Europeanization in Post-communist 
Romania. The Meaning of Citizenship in Sibiu: European Capital of Culture 2007”, Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2008, pp. 63-78.
4 L.J. KULCSÁR, C. BRADATAN, ”Politics without Frontiers: The Impact of Hungarian 
Domestic Politics on the Minority Question in Romania”, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, pp. 301-314.
5 K. DEEGAN-KRAUSE, ”Uniting the Enemy: Politics and the Convergence of Nationalisms 
in Slovakia”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18, no. 4, 2004, pp. 651-696.
6 S. DEETS, ”Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation: Politics and the Development of 
Ideas on Minority Rights”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 3, 2006, pp. 419-446.
7 B. FOWLER, ”Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics…cit.”; 
A. RAJACIC, ”Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning in 
Hungary between 2002 and 2006”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 4, 2007, 
pp. 639-660.
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formula, this kind of national-populism was seeking the emotional mobilization of 
the electors by a cultural redefinition of the past1. On the other hand, contrary to the 
opinion that emphasizes on the symbolical willingness of the Hungarian political elite 
to strengthen the ties with Hungarian diaspora and symbolically unify the nation, 
other scholars argue that Hungary’s decision was driven not by a growing ethnic 
nationalism in society, but by the party competition and especially by the party-
building strategy of right-wing elites2. In fact, by creating and distributing Hungarian 
certificates, a sort of ethnic identity cards, the law made the Hungarians living outside 
the borders legal subjects of Hungarian legislation and authority. Yet the motivation 
of the law, despite the growing desire to protect the Hungarian diaspora from 
assimilationist pressures, can be fully explained only by the willingness of political 
elites affiliated with the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) government (1998-
2002) to utilize the Hungarian diaspora issue as a political resource to further their 
own ideological, organizational and long-term strategical political goals3. Despite the 
compromise between the Hungarian and Romanian governments that put an end to 
Romanian official criticism4, namely the application of the law to Hungarian state 
territory only, eliminating ethnic discrimination in granting the working permits and 
removing visual highly symbolic items from the Hungarian certificates that could 
remind of the special political ties between ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and 
the Hungarian state5, the incident fully reveals the ethnic symbolic tensions ongoing 
in Transylvania.
Public Inscriptions in Hungarian
Public inscriptions are, alongside street names, one of the most salient ethnic 
markers. And the language alone is not the main problem, but the specific contents, 
since the use of ethnic Hungarian geographical denominations symbolically question 
the Romanian domination of the public space. As soon as new regulations were 
adopted in administration area following 1996 elections that brought DAHR into 
the governing coalition, Hungarian community claimed for widespread public 
inscriptions in Hungarian (road inscriptions, public institutions as schools, libraries, 
police departments), which triggered the response on nationalist Romanians who 
made great efforts to suspend the regulations6. The effectiveness of posting bilingual 
inscriptions varies from one district to another. On the one hand, many on the road 
inscriptions in Hungarian, for example, have been destroyed during night-time, but 
1 Ibidem, p. 642.
2 M.A. WATERBURY. ”Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and Party-
Building Strategies in Post-Communist Hungary”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, 
no. 3, 2006, pp. 483-515; A. BATORY, ”Kin-state Identity in the European Context: Citizenship, 
Nationalism and Constitutionalism in Hungary”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 16, no. 1, 2010, 
pp. 31-48.
3 M.A. WATERBURY. ”Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion…cit.”, p. 484.
4 C. IORDACHI, ”The Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Process, 1994-2001: From 
Conflict to Cooperation”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 88-133.
5 M. CHIRIAC, Provocările diversităţii. Politici publice privind minorităţile naţionale şi religioase 
în România, Etnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.
6 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Ruleta. Români şi maghiari, 1990-2000, Polirom, Iaşi, 2001.
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some Romanian inscriptions have been destroyed too. On the other hand, the lack of 
cooperation of many local elites and inadequate funding remain constant pitfalls. The 
responsiveness of local leaders generally depends on their political affiliation and on 
the degree of cooperation between Romanian and Hungarian political parties’ elites 
and central leaderships1. The legal disposition was generally implemented only in 
the areas where Hungarians formed a majority or which had DAHR mayors at the 
time2. Local authorities refuse sometimes to put in place legal requirements, claiming 
that minorities do not trespass (anymore) the 20% threshold, and do not replace the 
bilingual inscription that have been destroyed3.
Another highly symbolic issue in Transylvania are road touristic inscriptions 
that mark specific ethnic geographies. Covasna county-council, the governing body 
of Covasna county in Transylvania, decided to set up eight road touristic inscriptions 
at the county borders, marking the entry into the so called Szeklerland (”Szekelyfold” 
in Hungarian and ”Ţinutul Secuiesc” in Romanian). The denomination recalls the 
medieval administrative organization of Transylvania, when Szeklers, a Hungarian 
population defending the Eastern borders of the Hungarian kingdom, benefited of full 
autonomy4. The decision of the county-council, dominated by ethnic Hungarian elected 
officials, was criticized by local ethnic Romanian elites because of its symbolic ethnic 
connotation and the advertising panel was quickly removed by the Romanian State 
Road Company. Subsequently, the road company refused to deliver the compulsory 
technical documentation for the advertising panels demanded by Covasna county-
council and blocked any other attempt to set up similar advertising panels. The 
official motivation of the state road company was largely symbolic, meaning that the 
advertising panel was set against the principles of the Romanian unitary state.
The Use of Hungarian Language in Public Schools 
and Universities
Hungarian community’s willingness to benefit of separate schools after decades 
of forced ethnic cohabitation during communist rule is not easy to accept by ethnic 
Romanian community in Transylvania. On the one hand, new schools have to be 
built, especially where old public buildings have been returned to one community 
or another according to the property restitution act. This is often the case of old 
buildings in Transylvanian towns that have been returned to Hungarian churches. 
They are generally situated at the center of historical towns like Timişoara, Cluj, Arad, 
Braşov, Oradea. Moving Romanian schools to city periphery would mean to accept 
the symbolic primacy of Hungarian education. This is so sensitive because ethnic 
Romanian elites in Transylvania struggled for centuries to promote Romanian culture 
1 Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania…cit.”, 
p. 259.
2 D. CHIRIBUCĂ, T. MAGYARI, ”The Impact of Minority Participation in Romanian 
Government”, in Monica ROBOTIN, Levente SALAT (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and 
Minorities in Post-Communist Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, p. 84.
3 István HORVÁTH, ”Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din România”, cit.
4 G. KRISTÓ, Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 
2000; Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarians…cit.
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and to equal other national cultures in the region, especially Austrian and Hungarian 
ones1. On the other hand, ethnically separating the mixed schools is often seen by 
ethnic Romanians as granting too much autonomy for the Hungarian education 
in the overall framework of the unitary and national Romanian state, as well as an 
inadequate measure to support ”multiculturalism”. Thus, one could notice frequent 
protests from Romanian teachers and pupils when it comes to start using separate 
school buildings in various towns in the region. Yet the willingness to keep linguistic 
mixed universities often triggers the protests of Hungarian ethnic students and 
teachers, as it occurred at the bilingual state university ”Babeş-Bolyai” in Cluj.
This modern Transylvanian university was founded in Cluj by the Hungarian 
state, following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the formal political 
unification of Hungary with Transylvania. The end of the First World War led to the 
dismantling of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the unification of Transylvania 
with Romania. One of the top priorities for the new authorities was to take over 
control of the university. When the university with Romanian language of instruction 
was established in 1919, the Hungarian university was symbolically and officially 
transferred to Szeged, in the Republic of Hungary, but all the patrimonial goods of the 
former remained in Cluj, at the disposal of the new Romanian University. After the 
Second World War, as a testimony of friendship and cooperation between workers’ 
parties from communist Romania and communist Hungary, a state university with 
Hungarian language of instruction was established for a brief period of time under 
the name of the illustrious Hungarian mathematician ”Janos Bolyai”. In the aftermath 
of the Hungarian anti-communist revolution in 1956, the Romanian communist 
regime decided to merge the Hungarian university with the Romanian university 
”Victor Babeş” in a mixed university called ”Babeş-Bolyai” University (BBU). Since 
that institutional merger, the Hungarian speaking students and teachers benefit only 
of specific chairs inside mixed faculties, and not of fully autonomous departments 
and faculties.
The possibility of self-organization for Hungarian speaking faculties or even 
the creation of a separate university is a constant debate inside and outside ”Babeş-
Bolyai” University. Despite political negotiations between DAHR and the Romanian 
political party in government, the ruling body of the university, dominated by 
ethnic Romanian professors, rejected the autonomous organization of two faculties 
that encompass the current Hungarian chairs. The main argument of BBU ruling 
body is, except the threat to the scientific competitiveness, the preservation of 
”multiculturalism”, which is said to be better promoted by the current organization of 
chairs and faculties. The institutional pitfall thus triggered the response of Hungarian 
teachers and students from BBU, who protested on the streets of the city. Moreover, 
in response to the official argument of BBU regarding its ”multicultural” identity, 
two young Hungarian professors demanded that bilingual plates be installed inside 
BBU buildings that really express the willingness of Romanian teachers and students 
to share the public space with their Hungarian fellows. After being dismissed by the 
university’s governing body, the Hungarian teachers were symbolically awarded 
a prize by a Hungarian foundation for their particular contribution in keeping the 
identity of Hungarians in Romania.
1 Keith HITCHINS, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania…cit.
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CONCLUSION
Ethnically mixed areas are generally subject of ethnic conflict. Despite the 
progress made in the last two decades and the success in avoiding open conflict and 
bloodshed, ethnic struggle between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania lately 
became symbolic and non-material. It now uses mechanisms of differentiation and 
power in order to spatially mark the dominance of ethnic groups by items as flags, 
road signs, street names, churches and statues. Yet there are new symbolic issues, 
like territorial design and linguistic nationalism that overpass this spatial framework 
and affect the overall ethnic climate. Although the symbolic weight of ethnic issues 
in Transylvania is overlooked by scholars and the general public, it could actually be 
the key in comprehending and (partially) solving the conflict. Moreover, the ongoing 
symbolic struggle has important consequences for the democratization process in 
Romania in terms of the consolidation of an autonomous and neutral public space. 
As it is a space of freedom, equality and dialogue, the public space is an essential 
feature of democratization, because it enables ethnic communities and citizens to 
find the common grounds for political institutions and practices. In this respect, the 
Balkans are marked by a slower democratic transition, as it is complicated by cultural, 
religious and linguistic pluralism that affects state-building and nationhood.
Despite the reconciliation process between Hungary and Romania following 
their equal accession into NATO and the European Union, political relations are still 
marked by recurrent crises that relate rather on symbolic issues than on practical 
matter. The controversial Hungarian Status Law designed to give a series of rights 
in the kin country to Hungarian minority abroad raised the question regarding the 
symbolic relationship between language, citizenship and privileged ties between 
ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Hungarian state. Although ethnic relations 
in Transylvania have made an important progress since 1989, a step forward would 
be to agree on an overall power-sharing arrangement that guarantees significant 
minority rights, but also undeniable minority integration and loyalty. Until today, 
Hungarian minority had to defend its rights in every specific area by negotiating 
with various Romanian parties on power, yet it has no guarantee that already granted 
minorities’ rights will not be restricted for the future.
The Europeanization of Eastern Europe seems to signify for many optimistic 
scholars the end of ethnic conflict. Salat and Enache even raised the question if one 
could compare the Romanian-Hungarian relations to the historical French-German 
Reconciliation1. We think that this optimist perspective largely overlooks the power 
of ethnic symbolism in the region and the current mechanisms of ”ethnicisation” of 
the public sphere that are generally kept in a long-term status-quo, only for breaking 
out from time to time and returning to a precarious standstill. Taking them into 
account might help us to better estimate ethnic struggle and democratization in this 
complicated region of Transylvania.
1 Levente SALAT, Smaranda ENACHE (eds.), Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the 
French-German Reconciliation, Ethocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2004.
